What China’s Gene-Editing Deaths Reveal About Its Biotech Industry

Regulation alone won’t fix the conditions that have earned China the reputation of the “Wild East.”

Photo collage of brightly colored DNA strands layered between a gloved hand holding a medical syringe with a needle. Photo collage of brightly colored DNA strands layered between a gloved hand holding a medical syringe with a needle.
Mia Angioy for Noema Magazine
Credits

Jane Qiu is an independent science writer in Beijing.

BEIJING — In March 2023, four-year-old Mei in Shanghai was diagnosed with a rare genetic mutation linked to developmental delay and autism-like traits. Although her condition was mild and she improved with therapy and special education, her parents remained worried about her future. Hopeful for a cure, they paid Qiu Zilong, a renowned neuroscientist at Shanghai Jiao Tong University, and his team $860,000 to develop a customized gene therapy. The treatment, which used adeno-associated viruses to deliver gene editors to the brain, had been approved by Xinhua Hospital, a leading hospital for rare diseases.

On March 24, 2025, trillions of viral particles carrying gene editors were injected into Mei’s spinal cord. She soon developed a fever and kidney failure and died within days. A year later, Qiu’s team published its preclinical findings in Nature. Mei’s case was hailed by Chinese media as “a world-class breakthrough.” Mei’s death and her family’s financial support were not mentioned.

Deaths in clinical trials are not unusual. What is shocking are the regulatory lapses revealed by an investigation published this July in Science and subsequently corroborated by a separate investigation conducted by the Shanghai municipal government, which released its findings last week. The treatment’s consent form, for instance, didn’t warn of the possibility of death. The hospital had approved treatment before toxicology findings showing liver and kidney damage in monkeys that received similar treatments. And, among other crucial omissions, the researchers failed to disclose Mei’s death.

Apparently, this was not an isolated incident. Several researchers told me that Chinese hospitals commonly fail to disclose adverse events. On Aug. 5, STAT reported another death in a gene-editing trial led by Shanghai-based HuidaGene, an incident that had remained undisclosed for about 15 months. (The Chinese team published their findings, including the fatal case, in Cell on Oct. 26.) A founder of a rare-disease organization in China told me, on condition of anonymity for fear of political repercussions, that she had encountered other trials for genetic disorders in which deaths had gone unreported. Recent revelations of undisclosed deaths in clinical trials conducted in China have prompted warnings against the use of Chinese data in U.S. drug development.

As someone who has reported on China’s ethical governance for two decades, this all feels like déjà vu. Since modern bioethics was introduced to China in the late 1980s, its history has been punctuated by one scandal after another — often fueled by hype surrounding emerging technologies — that have earned the country a reputation as biotechnology’s “Wild East.”

Back in 2006, patients flocked to China to receive unproven stem-cell therapies. When immunotherapies came into vogue a decade later, bogus advertisements for unproven interventions proliferated online until the health ministry stepped in after the high-profile death of 21-year-old student Wei Zexi. Two years later, biophysicist He Jiankui shocked the world by announcing the birth of the first genetically modified babies created using CRISPR technology.

The response in China to Mei’s death has been divided. Some netizens portray Qiu as a reckless scientist willing to gamble with patients’ lives. Others, including longtime acquaintances, describe him as a diligent scientist committed to helping patients. In some respects, Qiu represents the antithesis of He. After the CRISPR-babies scandal, Qiu openly condemned He’s reckless behavior — only to become embroiled in a comparable scandal himself six years later.

It might be tempting to blame such scandals on individual failings. The deeper questions are: What systemic factors shaped their behavior? What does the incident reveal about China’s Achilles heel in biotechnology—and about the broader culture of international science in which it is embedded? And what can the lessons teach clinical research worldwide?

Fatal Flaw

It would be unfair to suggest that China hasn’t tried to strengthen its ethical governance. The CRISPR-babies scandal prompted deep soul-searching among Chinese scholars and government officials. Since then, President Xi Jinping reportedly championed an “ethics first” approach, contrasting the “science first” mindset often seen in Chinese research. New measures have included incorporating ethics provisions in China’s first Civil Law Code, creating a national ethics committee, and enacting new ethics-review guidelines for clinical research.

But powerful forces are also pushing in the opposite direction. In 2016, China launched Healthy China 2030, making rapid application of emerging medical technologies in clinical practice a priority — not only to address unmet medical needs but to boost national competitiveness. Reforms created a new pathway to translate basic research into clinical applications for cutting-edge technologies overseen by the health ministry, alongside the conventional drug-approval route regulated by the National Medical Products Administration (NMPA), China’s equivalent of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). This became widely known as the dual-track regulatory system.

“Since modern bioethics was introduced to China in the late 1980s, its history has been punctuated by one scandal after another — often fueled by hype surrounding emerging technologies.”

Under the technology track, clinical trials are often initiated by university researchers working with hospital clinicians rather than companies. Such investigator-initiated trials (IITs) exist worldwide. Until new regulations took effect this May, Chinese IITs were distinctive in that they could proceed with hospital approvals without the national regulatory oversight required for conventional drug trials. Compared with the NMPA route, the faster pathway allowed researchers to assess promising technologies in humans more quickly and at lower costs and help attract investment.

The result was a boom in IITs. By one estimate, more than 40,000 had been registered by April 2026, involving hundreds of thousands of participants and accounting for much of China’s translational research aimed at applying basic research to clinical practice.

China’s IIT model attracted worldwide attention. Kiran Musunuru, an expert on gene therapy at the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia, told me that “there is a widespread perception” that Chinese-style IITs offer a way to conduct first-in-human trials quickly and inexpensively. U.S. companies are increasingly interested in conducting IITs in China. Some U.S. researchers have even argued that the U.S should adopt elements of China’s model to accelerate drug discovery and enhance its competitiveness.

Critics, however, point to a fatal flaw: quality control. Driven by the pursuit of high-impact papers— whether for career advancement or hospital rankings — researchers rushed into first-in-human trials of emerging technologies. Hospitals are overwhelmed by proposals involving technologies with varying levels of risk. Researchers told me that as many as two dozen applications can be assessed in a single afternoon. In many cases, the process has become “a rubber-stamping exercise,” explained Zhu Wei, a bioethicist at the Shanghai Clinical Research Center.

A recent analysis of Chinese stem-cell IITs found that although a small fraction helped accelerate the application of basic research to clinical practice, most were repetitive, lacked innovation and wasted resources.

Musunuru — who led the landmark development of a personalized gene-editing trial for Baby KJ, an infant with a rare life-threatening deficiency of carbamoyl phosphate synthetase 1 that can cause dangerous ammonia buildup in the blood — warns that allowing individual hospitals to approve first-in-human trials of emerging technologies is particularly dangerous, because few researchers have sufficient experience to assess their risks. They would be “operating blind,” he told me, leaving the outcome dependent on “their appetite for risk.”

That appetite can be amplified by institutional conflicts of interest. Successful trials of emerging technologies can bring researchers and hospitals fame, career advancement, high rankings and resources. Jing-Bao Nie, a bioethicist at the University of Otago in Dunedin, New Zealand, told me that these incentives can undermine institutional judgment and jeopardize patient safety. In Mei’s case, he noted, the lure of a “world-class breakthrough” may have overwhelmed necessary caution.

Political interference, which is common in China, is another way the appetite for risk may outweigh caution. Chinese researchers told me that senior hospital leaders often chair the committees that review trial applications. When they seek to push through major projects led by prominent scientists, other committee members may feel unable to object.

A central regulator is more insulated from such pressures and can also draw on a far broader pool of expertise. As Musumuru notes, the FDA has an army of experienced reviewers who have assessed successful and failed trials, as well as those involving serious adverse effects. Its decisions are therefore informed by “the widest possible body of knowledge,” he told me. “That’s very reassuring.”

Oversight Deficiencies

Zhai Xiaomei, a bioethicist at the Peking Union Medical College and a member of the national science and technology ethics committee, was not wrong when she told New Beijing News that the problems exposed by Mei’s tragedy had improved since China’s State Council Order No. 818, which established a new regulatory framework for clinical research and commercial application of cutting-edge biomedical technologies, took effect this May.

Under the new rules, only top-tier hospitals can undertake IITs. Trials involving emerging technologies like gene and cell therapy, brain-machine interfaces, transplantation and microbial therapies must undergo further review by the health ministry after hospital approval. Adverse effects must be reported within five working days. Violations can result in fines, suspension or permanent ban on clinical research, loss of licenses and even criminal charges.

The scientific community in China and abroad welcomes the new rules. But a researcher working closely with the ministry, who spoke on condition of anonymity due to potential career repercussions, told me that it lacks sufficient staff with the necessary technical expertise to review the large volume of applications. Consequently, the researcher added, the reviews rely heavily on experts from universities and hospitals, with only a handful assessing each case. By contrast, Musunuru told me that the U.S. FDA employs numerous in-house reviewers, many with decades of experience, and dozens pore over each submission. If translating emerging technologies into clinical practice remains a national priority, he argues, China must make sustained investments in regulatory expertise to ensure trial safety and quality.

“If translating emerging technologies into clinical practice remains a national priority, China must make sustained investments in regulatory expertise to ensure trial safety and quality.”

More troublingly, Order 818 lacks mechanisms to monitor what happens locally and identify violations. It includes neither an inspection process — a crucial component of regulatory oversight in countries such as the U.S. and UK — nor a whistleblowing platform for reporting adverse effects and deaths. Such mechanisms are particularly important in countries where transparency is limited, and the press is not free. Without them, violations may go unnoticed and the penalties risk becoming little more than empty threats.

Researchers, like bioethicist Ma Yonghui of Xiamen University, also worry that regulatory exemptions could create loopholes. Military hospitals, for instance, fall outside health ministry rules. The two dozen or so free trade zones across China, particularly in Bo’ao on the tropical island of Hainan, may enjoy special regulatory treatment, potentially attracting foreign researchers and companies seeking to conduct ethically contentious trials they could not undertake in their own countries.

There are ample precedents of scientists exploiting countries with weak ethics governance as sites for risky research. In October 2018, one month before the CRISPR-babies scandal, He and John Zhang, founder and medical director of the New Hope Fertility Center in New York City, met Hainan’s vice governor to discuss establishing a clinic in Bo’ao to offer experimental procedures, including heritable genome editing. Zhang had already attracted international attention in 2016 for helping produce in Mexico the world’s first “three-parent baby” to prevent the transmission of mitochondrial DNA mutations from the mother. The procedure involved replacing faulty mitochondria with healthy ones from a female donor during in vitro fertilization, a procedure that was — and still is — illegal in the U.S.

Hype & Hope

While Mei’s death has prompted renewed soul-searching over China’s ethical failings, it would be a mistake to see it simply as a scientific scandal that can be fixed with new regulations, Nie told me. The case offers a window into people’s relationship with biotechnology in China as well as their hopes and expectations — shaped not only by scientists but by society at large.

Over the past decade, rare-disease advocacy organizations have grown rapidly in China, helping improve patient care, pressing for government support and driving research through collecting genetic data, studying disease progression and funding clinical trials. Su Yeyang, an independent anthropologist in Langfang in Hebei province who works with rare-disease communities, told me this has given families a sense of agency. With limited social support and a market-driven drug-discovery model that has failed rare-disease communities worldwide, they are doing whatever they can “to help themselves, their children and their community,” she said.

With gene therapy, the “magic cure” long hoped for by many rare-disease patients seems within reach. In one high-profile case, a fledgling company approached Xu Wei, a high-school graduate in his 30s in Kunming, in China’s southern province of Yunnan, to develop a gene therapy for his son. The boy had Menkes syndrome, a rare genetic disorder that impairs copper absorption and causes developmental delays and premature death. The company, with no track record in neurodevelopmental diseases, claimed to have developed the treatment in less than a year. In 2022, the 3-year-old received it at a private hospital in a trial that, based on publicly available accounts, appeared not to include biomarker or behavioral assessments of efficacy. Chinese media reported enthusiastically on anecdotal claims of improvements while downplaying the risks of undertaking such experimental therapies.

A patient advocacy leader told me such cases are not uncommon in China, where at least 20 million people are living with rare diseases. They offer hope, whether grounded in evidence or not, and can encourage others to follow. “We try to explain to families that pouring millions into a trial is no guarantee of success” and could even backfire, she says. Even well-educated parents, like Mei’s, may underestimate the complexity of clinical research and overestimate what experimental therapies can achieve.

It’s unclear whether Qiu, who was fired by the university last week and barred from participating in scientific research for five years following the government investigation, helped foster such expectations. He has not publicly given his account. But his book, “The Autism Enlightenment,” published this April, was revealing. It recounted how, in 2010, he told the mother of a child with Rett syndrome — a rare, genetic neurodevelopmental disorder leading to severe cognitive and physical impairments — that a cure would likely emerge in three to five years. It did not discuss fatal risks often associated with first-in-human trials. It did not mention Jessie Gelsinger, who had a mild form of ornithine transcarbamylase deficiency, a condition that can lead to abnormally high levels of ammonia in the blood and died in 1999 from a preventable complication of an experimental gene therapy.

“While Mei’s death has prompted renewed soul-searching over China’s ethical failings, it would be a mistake to see it simply as a scientific scandal that can be fixed with new regulations.”

Gelsinger was the first person publicly identified as having died in a gene therapy clinical trial, which undermined public trust in the field and set back its progress for decades. Nor did the book draw caution from the death in 2024 of a girl with Rett syndrome in the first brain-directed gene therapy for the condition. In both cases, scientists used the same type of virus as Qiu did.

In a society where disability and genetic disease remain stigmatized, and families receive limited support, Mei’s parents placed their hopes in Qiu and gene editing. Like the couple who turned to He Jiankui to protect their children from HIV and the associated discrimination by editing their embryos, they sought a technological solution to social problems.

As the Illness Challenge Foundation, a Beijing-based rare-disease advocacy organization, put it after Mei’s death, “responsible innovation should not entice patients to stake their lives in the name of hope.”

China’s Gelsinger Moment?

Gelsinger’s death in 1999 was a game changer. It’s widely regarded as a cautionary tale of how a toxic combination of scientific hype and insufficient safeguards can jeopardize patient safety. It triggered institutional reforms and significant changes in research culture in the U.S. that were aimed at rebuilding public and regulatory trust.

Mei’s death could be China’s Gelsinger moment. It has exposed regulatory failings, a scientific ethos that encourages hype and recklessness, and deeper societal problems surrounding disability and genetic disease. None is unique to China, but they are particularly acute in a country facing a distinctive combination of political and developmental challenges.

At the heart of the incident lies the “moral arbitrage” of experimental therapies, a recurrent theme in biotechnological innovation worldwide. On one hand, patients want access to cutting-edge, unproven treatments when they see them as their only hope. On the other hand, such treatments carry risks, which often accompany medical breakthroughs. Navigating the contours between hope and risk requires more than scientific evidence and regulatory rules, Su told me. It demands critical reflection on the culture of international science that places a premium on competition, sensational research, and being first at any cost. It also calls for broader societal dialogues about the diverse notions of human flourishing, the stigmatization of disabilities, and the need for greater support for people living with rare diseases.

If China can learn from the failures and undertake the regulatory, scientific and social reforms needed to address its biotech governance failures — and if the rest of the world can look beyond the country’s small number of success stories out of a hidden ocean of low-quality and potentially harmful clinical trials — Mei’s death will not have been in vain.